Sixty-two countries around the world use some form of in ‡ation targeting as their monetary policy framework, though none of these countries express explicit policy rules.
Introduction
Since its advent more than 25 years ago, in ‡ation targeting has become the dominant paradigm for how central banks conduct monetary policy. It would be natural to assume, given experience and the ubiquity of in ‡ation targeting across the globe, questions about how central banks communicate their frameworks and monetary policy decisions would largely be resolved.
However, given that no central bank mechanically follows an instrument-based monetary policy rule, such as a Taylor rule, central banks have adopted a variety of approaches in how they communicate their strategy. Still, in ‡ation targeting central banks generally seek to follow a systematic monetary policy guided by some underlying rule or optimal monetary policy framework, but are reluctant about turning policy over to a simple rule that may not be appropriate in all circumstances. Consequently, the challenge is how to convey a monetary policy strategy that is systematic and accountable for achieving some stated objectives, such as an in ‡ation target or full employment, without having to specify a speci…c interest rate rule.
In this paper, we develop a clear link between rules-based policy and communication. Three ingredients are essential to an e¤ective communication strategy and if combined properly, can replicate the information provided by a policy rule. Speci…cally, we show that specifying a point in ‡ation target, coupled with tolerance bands and economic projections, provide the same information as if a speci…c policy rule was revealed to the public.
To illustrate the connection, we use two simple models -a Fisherian model of in ‡ation and a New Keynesian model. Within these frameworks, a tolerance band, in ‡ation target and in ‡ation forecast convey the underlying reaction function. For example, in states when in ‡ation is outside of the band, a wide band combined with a forecast showing a slow return of in ‡ation to a rate inside the band signals an underlying policy rule with a weak response to in ‡ation. A tight band with a forecast showing a rapid return of in ‡ation to within the band conveys a rule with a stronger response to in ‡ation.
1 Importantly, the reaction function responds to in ‡ation in a uniform way whether in ‡ation is inside or outside the band. That is, there is no 'kink'in the underlying rule if in ‡ation deviates outside of the band. Instead, the reason for specifying a band, along with an in ‡ation forecast, is to convey the underlying policy rule. Alternatively, one straightforward approach to communication would be for a central bank 1 Central banks are well aware of these trade-o¤s. For example, Banco Central Do Brasil (2016) notes that the band cannot be too wide, since it could signal a lack of commitment to the in ‡ation target, which implies an instrument rule that responds weakly when in ‡ation deviates from target.
2 See Smets (2000) for some of the issues regarding the appropriate time frame for returning in ‡ation to target, as well as Orphanides and Weiland (2000) to simply specify and follow the prescriptions from a policy rule. Indeed, a pervasive approach to modeling monetary policy is to assume the central bank speci…es an in ‡ation target that it achieves by following an instrument-based policy rule or optimal monetary policy formulation. 3 While widely accepted in modeling monetary policy, in practice no central bank strictly follows a rule. A common rationale for this omission is that mechanical adherence to a rule may misguide practical policy decisions due to the multitude of shocks that commonly impinge on actual economies. 4 Some central banks have addressed this gap between theory and practice by issuing monetary policy reports that include in ‡ation, output, and interest rate projections.
Such projections can implicitly convey the central bank's reaction function, which is one of the key points of the in ‡ation-forecast targeting literature as developed by, for example, Svensson (1999) , Svensson (2002) , Svensson and Woodford (2005) and Woodford (2005) .
We build on the insights from in ‡ation-forecast targeting, but emphasize the importance of a tolerance band. Failure to specify a band may leave the public with a perception that hitting the target is always far into the future or conveys precision that is not achievable in practice. Even in standard NK models after a shock, a central bank following a standard Taylor rule hits its in ‡ation point objective only asymptotically, implying that in ‡ation is missing its target with near certainty at all points in time. The failure to hit an exact target can lead to some central banks persistently facing questions about their strategy and how to assess whether they are achieving their objectives. 5 Thus, one of the bene…cial by-products of our approach is that specifying tolerance bands and a horizon for moving back into the band, as indicated by forecasts, provides a clear performance metric with which to assess whether a central bank is meeting its objectives.
6
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we review in ‡ation targeting and communication strategies around the world, focusing on whether countries use tolerance bands and in ‡ation forecasts. In Section 3 we present a simple Fisherian model of in ‡ation determination, and show how a tolerance band and forecasts for in ‡ation can be used to communicate rules. Section 4 extends the results developed in the Fisherian model to a New Keynesian model of in ‡ation and output, and Section 5 concludes.
3 Rule-based policy has been shown to have a number of advantages in terms of stabilizing economic activity and in ‡ation, for example in closely approximating a fully optimal policy framework in a relatively simple and transparent manner (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007) . 4 For example, setting a single rule could generate inferior outcomes in the presence of structural change in the economy (Choi and Foerster, 2016) or if the rule is improperly speci…ed given the economic environment (Ikeda and Kurozumi, 2014) . 5 In the U.S., for example, Cochrane and Taylor (2016) and Warsh (2017) . 6 Walsh (2015) discusses the importance of such metrics and how they can a¤ect monetary policy actions.
In ‡ation Targeting Around the World
In this section, we review the conduct of in ‡ation targeting around the world. First, we highlight that while a large number of countries have targets for in ‡ation, they di¤er in whether they have tolerance bands or not, as well as if they produce explicit in ‡ation forecasts. Second, we discuss the experience of the Sveriges Riksbank with in ‡ation tolerance bands as an illustrative example of the issues surrounding tolerance bands. Table 1 lists the 62 countries with some form of an explicitly stated in ‡ation target. Among these, only 22 have single point targets, although these include some major economies such as the U.K. and U.S. The remaining countries have some sort of tolerance band: 27 specify a band around a speci…c midpoint (e.g. Canada's target of 2% 1%), 11 specify a band without an explicit midpoint (e.g. Australia's target of 2% 3%), while 2 have one-sided bands with an in ‡ation target that acts as an upper bound (e.g. Switzerland and the Euro area have targets of < 2%).
In ‡ation Targeting: Tolerance Bands and In ‡ation Forecasts
The table therefore highlights disagreement about how to set in ‡ation targets across the world, and prompts some concerns about how specifying point targets in addition to, or instead of, tolerance bands helps the performance and communication of monetary policy. In the cases without a band, there may be di¢ culty achieving a level of in ‡ation that exactly hits the target, which might translate to di¢ cultly communicating an implicit policy rule. In the cases of a band without a midpoint, the center of the band may be the implicit midpoint, but is still a gap in providing the information set needed to replicate a rules-based policy. In addition, for those countries that set a band of some sort, the widths of the bands varies across central banks, and this variation may signal something about the implicit policy rule. Lastly, these in ‡ation targets and tolerance bands convey objectives to be hit, but without reference to a time frame.
However, economic projections about in ‡ation or other objectives provide this information. are a point target for in ‡ation, a band around that objective, and forecasts. As a result, the countries listed in as having "Bands with Midpoints"and "Yes"forecasts in Table 1 come closest to following the communication strategy that replicates a rule-based policy.
Despite the fact that the Sweden does not appear on our list of countries that provide both forecasts and tolerance bands, the Sveriges Riksbank has changed how it communicates policy several times, and these changes illustrate some of the issues with such bands and forecasts.
So before presenting our theoretical Fisherian and New Keynesian models, we …rst examine the Riksbank's experience in detail.
The Sveriges Riksbank' s Experience with Tolerance Bands
The Riksbank is a useful example for understanding some of the issues central banks encounter regarding tolerance bands. In January 1993, a 2% in ‡ation target was set that was expected to be achieved in 1995 and then remain in e¤ect going forward. A tolerance band of +/-1% was also set around this target. According to Heikensten (1999) , the purpose of the band was to convey that deviations from the target are probable, but that the Riksbank had an intention of limiting such deviations. In May 2010, the tolerance bands were removed for a few reasons. First, as explained in Riksbank (2010) , there was a view that the public had su¢ cient understanding that monetary policy persistently faces uncertainty and unexpected events will cause in ‡ation to deviate from its target. Second, the Riksbank communicated that deviations from target can be part of a deliberate strategy under a ‡exible in ‡ation targeting framework, which places weight on achieving other objectives than only hitting the in ‡ation target. These deviations can, at times, exceed the tolerance interval. Third, in ‡ation expectations were viewed as well anchored, so deviations from the target, or even outside the tolerance interval, were not seen as having a tangible e¤ect on longer-term in ‡ation expectations. Since 1995 to the time the tolerance band was eliminated, in ‡ation was outside of the band about half of the time, but was not viewed as having any e¤ect on the Riksbank credibility. In sum, the Riksbank viewed the tolerance band as "obsolete," as deviations outside of the tolerance band were viewed as a "natural part of monetary policy." Dropping the bands were also viewed as having no consequences for the "way in which monetary policy is conducted and communicated." Riksbank (2016) revisits some of the costs and bene…ts of specifying a tolerance band. In terms of bene…ts, a band provides a signal that some variation around the target should be expected, though monetary policy will aim to limit such deviations. This is the same rationale supporting the original speci…cation of the tolerance band in 1993. One question is whether detailed in ‡ation forecasts, as given in the regular Monetary Policy Reports, provide these same bene…ts. In addition, however, Sveriges Riksbank (2016) notes a tolerance band may provide a "clearer alternative" of illustrating uncertainty around in ‡ation, so could complement the in ‡ation forecasts. In addition, a band may aid in de ‡ecting public criticism about the level of in ‡ation, as long as it was running within the interval. If so, then a band may support the credibility around monetary policy and support anchoring of longer-term in ‡ation expectations.
The size of the band, in practice, is also important, not only from the standpoint of supporting central bank credibility, but also from a communication perspective, as we illustrate in the next section.
A Fisherian Model of In ‡ation
In this section, we present a simple Fisherian model of in ‡ation and monetary policy in order to highlight how central bank communication about bands and horizons can pin down a rule.
Model Setup and Basic Results
The model is a simple Fisherian model of in ‡ation determination. The log-linearized equation for pricing a bond that costs $1 at time t and pays out at a net interest rate of i t in t + 1 is
where
denotes the time t expectation of in ‡ation in the subsequent period, and r t denotes the equilibrium ex ante real interest rate. This real interest rate is taken to be an exogenous process given by
with 0 < 1 and " t is iid with mean zero. Monetary policy follows a simple Taylor rule given
where governs how responsive the nominal interest rate is to in ‡ation. Note that, by loglinearizing around the appropriate steady state, we have already required a point in ‡ation target for monetary policy.
In this simple setup, a monetary authority could communicate its policy rule by stating a value of that would guide interest rate policy in response to shocks to the real interest rate that subsequently altered in ‡ation. However, the discussion in Section 2 highlights that most central banks prefer language about hitting an in ‡ation target or moving in ‡ation within some band, possibly within a speci…ed time frame. In this case, e¤ective communication will uniquely pin down , but vague communication will not.
The unique solution to the Fisherian economy in equations (1), (2), and (3), given the Taylor principle (
which relates realized in ‡ation to the current real interest rate r t , the monetary policy rule parameter , and features of the structural economy, which in this simple example are captured by the persistence of the real rate . Given that the structural shocks " t are iid, expected in ‡ation is given by
Using this equation that characterizes the path of expected in ‡ation given the current real interest rate, the monetary authority can give guidance about the policy parameter by communicating how fast policy will bring in ‡ation back to target. One way to accomplish this guidance is to give the entire expected path of in ‡ation
Communicating the path provides more than enough information for households and …rms to back out the policy parameter .
An additional way of communicating policy instead of producing an entire path for expected in ‡ation is to give a speci…c horizon and in ‡ation objective. If, given a current value for the real rate r t , the central bank states that it expects "in ‡ation will be from the in ‡ation target in N t periods,"this statement implies
In this case, the choice of tolerance and horizon N t are not necessarily pinned down as there is a continuum of ( ; N t ) that are implied by a policy parameter . Two important results, however, key on how to use this communication strategy and why it works to reveal the rule.
First, the in ‡ation target cannot be hit with precision in …nite time, so = 0 is impossible, as this implies N t ! 1 for all values of . Since the in ‡ation target is a point target, communication about returning in ‡ation to target in any time frame is infeasible. In other words, specifying a degree of tolerance around the in ‡ation target is imperative.
Second, the reason a statement about a tolerance and a horizon N t is e¤ective in communicating the policy rule is that equation (6) is invertible. Mathematically, after a shock r t and given and N t , the private sector can recover the policy parameter through
Further, the expected path of in ‡ation in equation (5) can be put in terms of the tolerance and the horizon N t , which now satis…es
and hence the communication uniquely pins down the expected path for in ‡ation. In this simple
Fisherian model, directly communicating the policy parameter is equivalent to communicating the tolerance and a horizon N t due to the unique mapping, but in more complex environments such as the New Keynesian model of Section 4, invertibility of communicated targets might be a problem.
Examples
The mapping in equation (6) has intuitive implications for how changes in the policy parameter produce di¤erent tolerances and horizons N t . In particular, a higher implies either a shorter horizon N t in order to hit a given tolerance , or a lower tolerance associated with a given horizon N t . Likewise, the inverse mapping in equation (6) also has straightforward implications for how changes in stated tolerances and horizons N t a¤ect the implied policy parameter. Given a speci…ed tolerance band , then a desire to hit that band in a shorter time (lower N t ) necessarily implies a higher value of the policy parameter . Likewise, given a speci…c horizon N t , then a desire to hit a smaller tolerance band (smaller ) requires a higher value of as well. Figure 1 shows how, given a calibrated value of = 0:9, for di¤erent policy parameters , the impulse response function of in ‡ation to a real rate shock can be used to pin down the band and the horizon N t . For example, after a 1pp shock to the real rate (r t = 1), a policy parameter of = 1:46 can be communicated through a range of ( ; N t ) combinations given by the red line, but if the monetary authority has an in ‡ation tolerance of = 0:5, then they can communicate the rule by saving "in ‡ation will be = 0:5 from the in ‡ation target in N t = 12
periods." Similarly, the central bank with a policy rule of = 1:27 could state "in ‡ation will be = 0:5 from the in ‡ation target in N t = 16 periods," while one with = 2:03 and a lower tolerance could state "in ‡ation will be = 0:25 from the in ‡ation target in N t = 12 periods."
Using tolerance bands and horizons also provides ‡exibility to vary communication after shocks of various sizes. As noted, Figure 1 depicts a band of = 0:5 and horizon N t = 12 can be used to convey a policy parameter of = 1:46 after a 1pp shock to the real rate. If instead, there is a 0.66pp shock, then the same rule can be communicated by "in ‡ation will be = 0:5 to show the inverse mapping in equation (7) by showing how a tolerance band and horizon N t imply a unique policy parameter . The curves show, given ( ; N t ), the implied that achieves those objectives. The mapping is unique, and given a larger N t implies a lower as monetary policy does not have to react as strongly to meet the horizon objective. Similarly, given a horizon N t , if the band is smaller, meaning is lower, then must be larger in order to bring in ‡ation within the band in the given time frame. Importantly, given a band , there are values of N t that imply < 1, which generates indeterminacy; for example if = 1:5 then the This simple Fisherian example thus highlights how a clearly articulated band for in ‡ation and a horizon can be used in place of specifying an exact policy rule. Given these simple results,
we now turn to a discussion of several implications for communication.
Implications for Communication
There are several important implications for how the inverse mapping between ( ; N t ) and shown in equation (7) matters for communication of policy. These results highlight how vague communication or being imprecise about the objectives of ( ; N t ) can lead to an rule with undetermined parameters.
First, if the communication is vague by stating "in ‡ation will be close to the in ‡ation target in N t periods," rather than specifying an exact tolerance, a range of values for are possible.
In this case, if close is interpreted as possibly a range of tolerances 2 ; , then the range of possible policy parameters is given by 2 Nt r t + ; Nt r t + .
For example, when = 0:9, if N t = 12, then Figure 
A New Keynesian Model of In ‡ation and Output
In this section, we extend the intuition built in the previous section for a model in which in ‡ation and output are jointly determined, and show a similar mapping from bands and horizons to a policy parameter exists, but also document in which cases it does not. We start with a simple forward looking model, and discuss communication in cases with only demand and supply shocks before turning to the case with both shocks; we then extend the simple model to one in which interest rates are set inertially.
Model Setup
The model is a simple New Keynesian model where in ‡ation and output are jointly determined by supply and demand shocks. The two equations describing the private economy are the log-linearized equations derived from a consumption Euler equation
and an aggregate supply condition
where x t denotes the output gap, g t is an aggregate demand shock, u t is an aggregate supply shock. The shocks follow autoregressive processes given by
and
with, for j = g; u, 0 j < 1; and " j;t is iid with mean zero. Monetary policy is given by a Taylor rule of the form
Again, by log-linearizing around the appropriate steady state, we have required a point in ‡ation target for the monetary authority.
As in the Fisherian example, a monetary authority could communicate its policy rule by stating values of and , but as noted in Section 2, this communication strategy is not embraced by central banks around the world. Instead, they tend to prefer giving bands around the in ‡ation target as well as forecasts.
Following the same logic as used in the Fisherian economy, provided the Taylor principle ( 1) holds, a unique solution is given by t = g ( ; )
for in ‡ation, and
for output, where
In this solution, we have used notation to explicitly stress that g ( ; ) and u ( ; ) are functions of the policy parameters and .
Given that the structural shocks " g;t , and " u;t are iid, expected in ‡ation is given by
and the expected output gap equals
Note that, similar to equation (5), that these two equations are functions of the structural parameters governing the economy, as well as the policy parameters and .
While we will consider analytic derivations in the results below where possible, a set of baseline parameters presented in Table 2 will be used for numerical results as well. We …rst consider the environment with only demand shocks, and then only supply shocks, before returning to the case with both types of shocks. 
Demand Shocks Only
We …rst consider a monetary authority that only faces demand shocks, so u t = 0 for all t. As in the Fisherian model, the monetary authority can communicate that, given a current value for the demand shock g t , that it expects "in ‡ation will be from the in ‡ation target in N ;t periods,"and from equation (20) this communication satis…es
Conditional on policy rule parameters and , there are a continuum of choices for guidance on the tolerance and the horizon N ;t . The in ‡ation target cannot be hit in …nite time, so = 0 remains impossible in this case. However, in contrast with the Fisherian model, the communication of a tolerance and horizon N ;t is not invertible in the sense that the mapping for is a linear function of given by
In the case of demand shocks only, the fact that under active policy ( 1) in ‡ation and the output gap move in the same direction means no guidance can pin down the exact policy coe¢ cients and , but since these policy parameters are e¤ectively substitutes, there is no issue with pinning down dynamics. To see this fact, suppose the monetary authority announces "in ‡ation will be from the in ‡ation target in N ;t periods,"which implies that and must satisfy the restriction in equation (23); using the restriction with the de…nition of g ( ; ) in this case, the expected paths for in ‡ation, the output gap, and interest rates are
respectively. The key result in these equations is that providing communication about in ‡ation directly pins down the expected paths for in ‡ation, the output gap, and the interest rate since they comove in direct fashion, and hence how the economy evolves does not depend on the exact speci…cation of or .
Figure 3 provides a numerical example based upon the calibration in Table 2 . In this case, if there is a 1pp demand shock (g t = 1) and the monetary authority expresses its rule by stating "in ‡ation will be = 0:25 from the in ‡ation target in N ;t = 16 periods,"this communication produces a restriction on and given by = 1:5731 0:68125 . Given a rule that satis…es this restriction, the impulse responses for in ‡ation, the output gap, and interest rates are all identical.
Since giving communication about in ‡ation implies a set of rules under which dynamics for in ‡ation, the output gap, and the interest rate are all identical, any further communication ends up being irrelevant. Suppose the monetary authority gives guidance about the output gap, speci…cally that "the size of the output gap will be x in N x;t periods," where from equation
However, as noted, given communication about in ‡ation, then the path of the output gap is already pinned down by and N ;t , and hence any communication about the output gap is redundant.
Returning to considering only communication about in ‡ation, even though equation (23) shows a non-unique mapping from the band and horizon N ;t to the policy parameters and , changes in the communication produce intuitive changes in policy. Figure 4 shows the set of ( ; ) given di¤erent values of and N ;t . The sets of parameters that correspond to a given communication is a downward sloping line, as increases in go along with decreases in , since demand shocks move in ‡ation and the output gap in the same direction and hence reacting more strongly to one means reacting less strongly to the other in order to hit the same band and horizon. The top panel shows that, for = 0:25, increasing the horizon implies lower values of ( ; ), while the bottom panel shows that given N ;t = 16, increasing the size of the Keynesian demand shock case, less reaction to the output gap. In addition, these results show that too long a horizon given a band width or too wide a band given a horizon can imply an indeterminate equilibrium with < 1.
There are three implications from these result son demand shocks only. First, a monetary authority in an economy that faces only demand shocks will never need to specify an exact value for and , because if it produces and N ;t it generates a class of rules that produce identical paths for in ‡ation and the output gap. Second, if the monetary authority is a strict in ‡ation targeter with = 0 so that it does not react to the output gap, then in ‡ation communication in the form of x and N x;t is redundant, since communication about and N ;t pins down the path for both in ‡ation and the output gap. Of course, the opposite is true as well, implying the monetary authority only needs to provide one of ( ; N ;t ) or ( x ; N x;t ) to describe its rule.
Supply Shocks Only
Now we consider a monetary authority that faces only supply shocks, so g t = 0 for all t. In this case, the monetary authority could communicate that after a supply shock of u t , "in ‡ation will be from the in ‡ation target in N ;t periods," and from equation (20) this communication
Once again, there are a continuum of choices for guidance on the tolerance and the horizon N ;t conditional on policy rule parameters and , although = 0 is not feasible. As in the case with demand shocks only, the communication of a tolerance and horizon N ;t is not invertible in the sense that the mapping for is a linear function of given by
Similar to the demand shock only case, communication about in ‡ation is su¢ cient to pin down the expected paths of in ‡ation and the output gap, and the exact policy parameters and do not matter for dynamics. Again, suppose the monetary authority announces "in ‡ation will be from the in ‡ation target in N ;t periods," which implies that and must satisfy the restriction in equation (29); using the restriction with the de…nition of u ( ; ) in this case, the expected paths for in ‡ation, the output gap, and the interest rate are
respectively. The key result from these equations is the independence from and , which highlights that providing communication about in ‡ation directly pins down the expected paths for in ‡ation, the output gap, and the interest rate without the need to specify the exact policy rule.
Figure 5 provides a numerical example based upon the calibration in Table 2 . In this case, if there is a 1pp supply shock (u t = 1) and the monetary authority expresses its rule by stating "in ‡ation will be = 0:25 from the in ‡ation target in N ;t = 16 periods,"this communication produces a restriction on and given by = 0:97221 + 0:81473 . Given a rule that satis…es this restriction, the impulse responses for in ‡ation, the output gap, and interest rates are all authority states "the size of the output gap will be x in N x;t periods," where from equation
this restriction adds no information to the in ‡ation communication, as the path of the output gap is pinned down by a statement of and N ;t .
Returning to considering only communication about in ‡ation, Figure 6 shows the set of ( ; )
given di¤erent values of and N ;t , and how these change with di¤erent communication. As opposed to the demand shock only case show in Figure 4 , the set of ( ; ) that achieve a given communication is an upward sloping line under supply shocks; this feature is due to the fact that supply shocks move in ‡ation and output in opposite directions and hence increasing the responsiveness to in ‡ation requires an o¤setting stronger response to the output gap in order to hit the same communicated band and horizon. At the same time, the di¤erences in these lines mirrors those in the demand shock case; increasing the horizon with a …xed band size 
Demand and Supply Shocks
We now return to the case when with both supply and demand shocks. In this case, guidance that "in ‡ation will be from the in ‡ation target in N ;t periods,"requires
given current demand and supply shocks. As in the cases already considered, a continuum of choices for communicating a tolerance and horizon N ;t conditional on policy rule parameters and exist, although = 0 is not feasible. As in the case with demand shocks only, the communication of a tolerance and horizon N ;t is not invertible. However, rather than being a linear function of as under supply or demand shocks only, the mapping is instead a complicated nonlinear function of . of the output gap will be x in N x;t periods,"where equation (21) implies
and the absolute value shows that the output gap may be negative. 9 If the monetary authority communicates = 0:25 and N ;t , the set of policy parameters 9 We restrict consideration to rules that have 1 and 0, which imply unique equilibria conditional on to continue to satisfy the in ‡ation guidance, as seen in the discussion of supply shocks.
As alluded to in the discussion on demand and supply shocks only, an additional way to uniquely pin down the rule using only in ‡ation communication is for monetary policy to be a strict in ‡ation targeter with = 0. In this case, the restriction on e¤ectively replaces the communication of the output gap, and Figure 8 shows that communication that "in ‡ation will be = 0:25 from the in ‡ation target in N ;t = 16 periods," conveys a unique value = 1:81, while Figure 7 shows the unique path of in ‡ation, the output gap, and the interest rate in this case.
The implications for the model with both types of shocks di¤er from the implications when just considering supply or demand shocks in isolation. In the presence of both shocks, communi- 
Interest Rate Smoothing
We lastly turn to a model where monetary policy is given by an inertial Taylor rule of the form
In this case, the existence of an endogenous predetermined variable i t 1 implies there is no longer a simple closed form solution for t and x t , but instead there are solutions of the form 
where ( i ; ; ) is a function of the parameters, and where we have used notation to explicitly stress that the solution depends on the policy parameters i , , and . The expected paths of in ‡ation, the output gap, and the interest rate are given by
respectively. As a result, communication that "in ‡ation will be from the in ‡ation target in N ;t periods,"requires
while "the size of the output gap will be x in N x;t periods,"implies
Building on the numerical example using the calibration in Table 2 and presented in Figure   7 for the case without interest rate inertia ( i = 0), communication after a 1pp demand and supply shock that "in ‡ation will be = 0:25 from the in ‡ation target in N ;t = 16 periods, and the size of the output gap will be x = 2 in N x;t = 4 periods"will pin down the parameters of the rule and . However, as Figure 9 shows, when i 0 this communication is not in fact enough to pin down the rule. In this case, there are in…nitely many combinations of the full set of policy parameters ( i ; ; ) that achieve ( ; N ;t ) = (0:25; 15) and ( x ; N x;t ) = (2; 4).
Consequently, if in addition to communication about in ‡ation and the output gap, the monetary authority gives communication about the interest rate, then the rule can be pinned down.
If the monetary authority states "the level of the interest rate will be i in N i;t periods,"then
and this statement generates an additional restriction on ( i ; ; ) that fully pins down the rule. As shown in Figure 9 , given the in ‡ation and output gap communication, there are many di¤erent possible rules, with the three in particular being shown. If the monetary authority states "the level of the interest rate will be i = 3 in N i;t = 1 periods,"then this statement pins 
